We investigate the average-case complexity of a generalization of the compact knapsack problem to arbitrary rings: given m (random) ring elements a 1 , . . . , a m ∈ R and a (random) target value b ∈ R, find coefficients x 1 , . . . , x m ∈ S (where S is an appropriately chosen subset of R) such that
Introduction
Few problems in the theory of computational complexity and its application to the foundations of cryptography have been as controversial as the knapsack problem and its many variants, including the notorious NP-hard subset-sum problem (Karp 1972) . The initial enthusiasm generated by the subset-sum based cryptosystem of Merkle & Hellman (1978) in the late 70's was immediately followed by intensive cryptanalytic efforts that culminated in the early 80's with the total break of the system in its basic (Shamir 1984) and iterated version (Brickell 1984) . Still, the possibility of building cryptographic functions based on NP-hard problems, and the relatively high speed at which numbers can be added up (compared to modular multiplication and exponentiation operations required by number theoretic functions), prompted many researchers to suggest variants, fixes, and improvements (e.g., Chor & Rivest 1988; Goodman & McAuley 1984) to the initial Merkle-Hellman proposal. These efforts, which lasted for more than a decade, were invariably followed by attacks (e.g., Joux & Stern 1993; Nguyen & Stern 1997; Odlyzko 1989; Schnorr & Hörner 1995) that seriously questioned the security of the systems either in theory or in practice. Recently, knapsack-like cryptographic functions have started attracting again considerable attention after Ajtai's discovery (Ajtai 2004 ) that the generalized subset-sum problem (over the additive group Z n p of n-dimensional vectors modulo p) is provably hard to solve on the average based on a worstcase intractability assumption about certain lattice approximation problems for which no polynomial-time solution is known. Following Ajtai (2004) , Ajtai & Dwork (1997) also proposed a public-key cryptosystem with similar security properties. But, unfortunately, even this proposal with strong theoretical security guarantees has been subject to practical attacks (Nguyen & Stern 1998) .
Attacks to subset-sum (or more generally knapsack) problems can be classified into two broad categories:
1. attacks targeted to specific public-key cryptosystems that try to exploit the special structure resulting from the embedding of a decryption trapdoor (e.g., Shamir 1984) ; and 2. attacks to generic subset-sum or knapsack instances that can be applied regardless of the existence of a trapdoor (e.g., Coster et al. 1992; Lagarias & Odlyzko 1985) .
The first class of attacks is usually stronger, meaning that it gives asymptotically good algorithms that succeed (with high probability) regardless of the cc 16 (2007) Generalized compact knapsacks 367 value of the security parameter, but only applies to specific public-key cryptosystems whose underlying knapsack problems are not as hard as the general case. The second class of attacks is more general but only heuristic: the asymptotic complexity of these attacks is usually exponential, or their success rate negligible as a function of the security parameter. These methods are evaluated experimentally by testing them on specific problem instances (e.g., challenges or randomly generated ciphertexts) for typical values of the security parameter, and attacks can be usually avoided setting the security parameter to a sufficiently large value. Still, the effectiveness of these attacks, even for moderately large values of the security parameter, is currently considered the main practical obstacle to the design of cryptographic functions based on variants of the knapsack problem.
It is important to realize that the second class of attacks dismisses most knapsack cryptographic functions as practical alternatives to number theory based functions, not on the grounds of their inherent insecurity, but simply because of the large key sizes required to avoid heuristic attacks. In fact (especially if one drops the more ambitious goal of designing a public-key cryptosystem, and more modestly attempts to design cryptographic primitives with no trapdoors, like pseudo-random generators or one-way hash functions, etc.) there is theoretical evidence (Ajtai 2004; Ajtai & Dwork 1997; Impagliazzo & Naor 1996; Regev 2004b ) that subset-sum can indeed be a good source of computational hardness, at least from an asymptotic point of view. The main issue affecting the practical security of knapsack functions is efficiency. In a typical knapsack function, the key (corresponding to security parameter n) consists of Ω(n) numbers, each of which is n bits long. Therefore, the size of the resulting cryptographic key grows as Ω(n 2 ). Even if all known attacks to knapsack have exponential time complexity, one needs to set n to at least a few hundreds to make heuristic approaches (most notably lattice basis reduction, see Joux & Stern 1998; Lenstra et al. 1982; Nguyen & Stern 2000 , 2001 Schnorr & Euchner 1994 ) ineffective or too costly. As a consequence, the resulting key can easily reach megabit sizes still without achieving a sufficient degree of security. Even if knapsack functions can still be competitive from a running time point of view, these huge key sizes are considered too big for most practical applications.
Generalized compact knapsacks.
The impact of space efficiency on the practical security of knapsack based functions has long been recognized, even before the development of ingenious lattice-based attacks. A simple improvement that comes to mind is to use a so-called compact knapsack: instead of using 0-1 combinations of Ω(n) input weights (resulting in Ω(n 2 ) key size), con-368 Micciancio cc 16 (2007) sider a smaller (constant, or slowly increasing) number of weights a 1 , . . . , a m and combine them with coefficients from a larger set, e.g., {0, . . . , 2 δn } for some small constant δ > 0. Notice that if δ = 0, then we get the usual subset-sum problem, which can be solved (for m = O(log n)) in polynomial time using exhaustive search. However, if δ = Ω(1) then the search space becomes exponentially large, and exhaustive search is infeasible. Suggestions of this type appear already in Merkle and Hellman's original paper (Merkle & Hellman 1978) and subsequent works as a method to increase the bandwidth of the scheme. These early attempts to reduce the key size of knapsack based functions were subject to attacks even more devastating than the general case: in Amirazizi et al. (1983) it is observed that the problem easily reduces to an integer programming instance with O(m) variables, and therefore it can be solved in polynomial time for any constant value of m(n) = O(1), or even any slowly growing function m(n) = O(log n/ log log n). Attempts to use compact knapsacks to design efficient cryptographic functions persisted during the 90's (Lin et al. 1995; Orton 1994 ), but were always followed by cryptanalytic attacks (Cusick 1995; Lee & Park 1999; Ritter 1996) .
In this paper we introduce and study a new class of compact knapsacks which are both very efficient and provably hard to solve in a strong sense similar to Ajtai's function (Ajtai 2004) . The one-way function proposed by Ajtai (2004) can be described as a generalization of the integer knapsack problem to arbitrary rings. Specifically, for any ring R and subset S ⊂ R, consider the following problem: given ring elements a 1 , . . . , a m ∈ R and a target value b ∈ R, find coefficients
where all operations are performed in the ring. In Ajtai's work, R is the product ring 1 Z n p of ndimensional vectors modulo p (for some polynomially bounded p(n) = n O(1) ) and S = {0, 1} consists of the additive and multiplicative identities of the ring. In particular, S has size 2, and the problem can be solved by exhaustive search in polynomial time when m = O(log n).
In this paper we study compact versions of the generalized knapsack problem, where the set S has size much larger than 2, so that exhaustive search is infeasible even for very small values of m. In the case of the ring Z n p , the first idea that comes to mind is to use as coefficients the set S = {0, 1} n of all binary vectors, or, more generally, the set S = {0, . . . , p δ } n of n-dimensional vectors with entries much smaller than p. Unfortunately, as for the case of the integer compact knapsack problem described above, this straightforward construction admits much faster solutions than exhaustive search: the resulting cc 16 (2007) Generalized compact knapsacks 369 generalized compact knapsack is equivalent to n independent instances of the knapsack problem modulo p, which can be efficiently solved in the worst case for any polynomially bounded p(n) = n O(1) by dynamic programming, and on the average for p(n) = n O(log n) using the methods of Flaxman & Przydatek (2005) and Lyubashevsky (2005) .
Our contribution. The main contribution of this paper is the study of a new class of compact knapsack functions f a (x) = i a i · x i that are provably hard to invert in a very strong sense, even when the number m of weights is very small. In particular, we prove that, for appropriate choice of ring R and subset S ⊂ R, and for any unbounded function m(n) = ω(1) (with arbitrarily slow growth rate) the compact knapsack function is at least as hard to invert on the average (even with non-negligible probability) as the worst-case instance of various lattice problems (for the special class of cyclic lattices, i.e., lattices that are invariant under cyclic rotations of the coordinates) for which no polynomial time algorithm is known.
Our generalized knapsack problems are defined by the ring R = Z n p of ndimensional vectors modulo a prime p with the componentwise addition and convolution product operations. As in the previously discussed compact variant of Ajtai's function, the set S = {0, . . . , p δ } n consists of all n-dimensional vectors with small entries. Remarkably, using the convolution product operation (as opposed to componentwise multiplication) makes the problem considerably harder: solving random instances of our generalized compact knapsacks with non-negligible probability is as hard as approximating the shortest independent vector problem (as well as various other lattice problems) on cyclic lattices in the worst case within factors n 1+ (for any > 0) almost linear in the dimension of the lattice.
This results in strong one-way functions with average-case security guarantees based on a worst-case intractability assumption similar to Ajtai's function (Ajtai 2004) (and subsequent improvements of Cai & Nerurkar 1997; Micciancio 2004; Micciancio & Regev 2007 ) but with a much smaller key size O(m log p n ) = ω(1) · n log n, where ω(1) is an unbounded function with arbitrarily slow growth rate. (For comparison, Ajtai (2004); Cai & Nerurkar (1997) ; Micciancio (2004) ; Micciancio & Regev (2007) require m(n) = Ω(n log n), and key size Ω(n 2 log 2 n).)
Our compact knapsack functions are also extremely fast, as, for appropriate choice of the parameters, they can be computed in almost linear time O(n log c n) using the fast Fourier transform (FFT) in the evaluation of the convolution products. Specifically, the cost of evaluating our functions is equiv-cc 16 (2007) alent to computing an almost constant number ω(1) of FFT operations on n-dimensional vectors modulo a small prime p = n O(1) . The almost linear time evaluation algorithm together with the substantially smaller key size, make our generalized compact knapsack function even much faster than the already attractive subset-sum function.
In the process of establishing our hardness result, we prove various properties of our knapsack functions that might be of independent interest. In particular, we prove that our compact knapsack function f a (x) has very small collision probability, when the input is chosen uniformly at random. By a result of Rackoff (reported in Impagliazzo & Zuckerman 1989) , this is enough to guarantee that the value f a (x) (for randomly chosen a and x) is almost uniformly distributed over Z n p and independent from a = (a 1 , . . . , a m ). Moreover, this is true for arbitrary small values of m(n) = ω(1). Previous results of this kind for the subset-sum function relied on the additive structure of Z n p alone, and required m = Ω(n log p). Our proof makes substantial use of the multiplicative structure of the ring Z n p (with the convolution product operation) and the characterization of its ideals as polynomial quotient rings.
Beside the technical contribution of a very efficient and provably secure one-way function based on a worst-case complexity assumption, we view the following as additional contributions of this paper: the introduction of the class of cyclic lattices as a source of interesting computational problems; casting a new light on the complexity of the compact knapsack problem showing that if the ring is appropriately chosen the problem can be substantially harder than the integer case; and demonstrating that the techniques initially developed by Ajtai (2004) ; Micciancio & Regev (2007) can be useful to study seemingly different problems, and still produce the same kind of strong worst-case/average-case security guarantees. In our view all these contributions are important steps toward the development of cryptographic functions that are both efficient and provably secure in a very strong sense. Finally, we remark that the problem of inverting our generalized compact knapsack function can be equivalently formulated as the problem of finding a lattice point (in a quasi-cyclic 2 lattice) close to a given target. (See Section 5 for details.) Therefore, our main result is interesting also from a purely complexity theoretic perspective, since it establishes a connection between the worst-case and average-case complexity of solving various lattice problems on (quasi-)cyclic lattices. This is analogous to previous results (Ajtai 2004; Cai & Nerurkar 1997; Goldreich et al. 1996; Micciancio 2004; Micciancio & Regev 2007) connecting the worst-case cc 16 (2007) Generalized compact knapsacks 371 and average-case complexity of problems on arbitrary lattices, but adapted to the special class of lattices with (quasi-)cyclic structure.
Related work. The first construction of one-way function that is provably secure based on a worst-case complexity assumption was given by Ajtai (2004) . Subsequent work (Cai & Nerurkar 1997; Micciancio 2004; Micciancio & Regev 2007 ) focused on weakening the required worst-case complexity assumption. In this paper, the goal is to improve the efficiency of the one-way function.
This paper is an almost complete rewriting and substantial improvement of an extended abstract (Micciancio 2002a ) presented at FOCS 2002 . In particular, in (Micciancio 2002a ) the author proved that solving the generalized compact knapsack on the average when m = O(log n) is at least as hard as approximating various lattice problems in the worst case within a factor n 3+ . Here, we prove a new regularity theorem for compact knapsack functions (Theorem 4.2) and incorporate the recently developed Gaussian distribution techniques of Micciancio & Regev (2007) to obtain an improved result that holds for any function m = ω(1) with arbitrarily slow growth rate, and worst-case approximation factors n 1+ , almost linear in the dimension of the lattice. Following the writing of this paper, it has been shown (Lyubashevsky & Micciancio 2006; Peikert & Rosen 2006 ) that variants of our generalized compact knapsack function are not only one way, but also collision resistant, a stronger and very useful cryptographic property. These improvements and related open problems are discussed in Section 5.
From a theoretical point of view, the main difference between our one-way functions and those studied in previous work (e.g., Ajtai (2004) ; Micciancio & Regev (2007) and related papers,) is that our functions are based on the worst-case intractability of lattice problems on a class of lattices with a special cyclic structure. Many lattice problems are known to be NP-hard even in their approximation versions for sufficiently small approximation factors. For example, the shortest vector problem (SVP) is NP-hard (under randomized reductions) to approximate within any constant factor (Ajtai 1998; Khot 2005; Micciancio 2001c ), while the closest vector problem (CVP) is NP-hard to approximate even within quasi polynomial factors n O(1/ log log n) (Arora et al. 1997; Dinur et al. 2003; van Emde Boas 1981) . These results support the conjecture that lattice problems are hard to solve in the worst case, at least for arbitrary lattices. It is natural to ask whether lattice problems remain hard even when the input lattice is cyclic.
Very little is known about the computational complexity of lattice problems on cyclic lattices. In fact, as far as we know, cyclic lattices have received little cc 16 (2007) or no attention so far. From an algorithmic point of view, it is not clear how to exploit the cyclic structure of the lattice in state of the art lattice algorithms, e.g., lattice basis reduction. The only algorithmic results related to cyclic lattices we are aware of are (Gentry & Szydlo 2002; Howgrave-Graham & Szydlo 2004; May & Silverman 2001; Szydlo 2003) . The first paper (May & Silverman 2001) shows how the solution of certain lattice problems can be speeded up by a factor n when the lattice is cyclic of dimension n. This is a quite modest improvement since the running time of the best algorithms to solve these problems over general lattices is exponential in n. A more interesting algorithmic result is given by Gentry & Szydlo (2002); Howgrave-Graham & Szydlo (2004) ; Szydlo (2003) . The problem considered by Howgrave-Graham & Szydlo (2004) (and solved building on previous algorithms of Gentry & Szydlo 2002; Szydlo 2003 ) is the following: given the autocorrelation 3 of a vector x, retrieve x. This problem (which arises from applications in n-dimensional crystallography) is related to cyclic lattices by the fact that the autocorrelation of x can be expressed as a vector in the cyclic lattice generated by x. This problem is quite different from the worst-case computational problems on cyclic lattices considered in this paper, and it is not clear if the techniques of Gentry & Szydlo (2002) ; Howgrave-Graham & Szydlo (2004) ; Szydlo (2003) can be used to speed up the solution of other problems, like SVP, CVP or their variants SIVP (shortest independent vector problem) and GDD (guaranteed distance decoding) over cyclic lattices. Based on the current state of knowledge, it seems reasonable to conjecture that approximation problems on cyclic lattices are computationally hard, at least in the worst case and for small polynomial approximation factors. In order to further support this conjecture, it would be nice to prove NP-hardness results for lattice problems when restricted to cyclic lattices.
We remark that our definition of cyclic lattices is analogous to the definition of cyclic codes, one of the most useful and widely studied classes of codes in coding theory. Still, no polynomial time algorithm is known for many computational problems on cyclic codes (or lattices). A very recent result somehow suggesting that no such polynomial time algorithm may exist is the proof in Guruswami & Vardy (2005) that the nearest codeword problem (the coding analogue of the closest vector problem for lattices) for appropriately shortened Reed-Solomon codes is NP-hard. Reed-Solomon codes are a well known class of cyclic codes, so the result in Guruswami & Vardy (2005) seems to suggest that the nearest codeword problem is hard even when the code is cyclic. Unfortunately, shortening the Reed-Solomon code (as done in Guruswami & Vardy cc 16 (2007) Generalized compact knapsacks 373 2005) destroys the cyclic structure of the code, so, the results in Guruswami & Vardy (2005) do not imply the NP-hardness of the nearest codeword problem over cyclic codes. We leave, as an open problem, to prove hardness results for any lattice or coding problem over cyclic lattices or codes. Is the shortest vector problem on cyclic lattices NP-hard? Is the shortest independent vector problem on cyclic lattices NP-hard? What about the closest vector problem on cyclic lattices? Is the closest vector problem NP-hard even for fixed families of cyclic lattices as shown (for arbitrary lattices) in Feige & Micciancio (2004) ; Micciancio (2001a); Regev (2004a) ?
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall basic notation, definitions and results needed in this paper. In Section 3 we prove two preliminary lemmas about cyclic lattices that will be used in the proof of our main result. In Section 4 we present the main technical result of the paper: we formally define our generalized compact knapsack function, and prove that inverting the function on the average is at least as hard as the worstcase instance of various lattice problems on cyclic lattices. In the process, we also establish various other properties of our compact knapsack function that might be of independent interest, e.g., we bound the collision probability of the function, and prove that the function is almost regular. Section 5 concludes with a discussion additional related results and open problems.
Preliminaries
In this section we introduce some notational conventions, and recall basic definitions and results about the statistical distance, hash functions, lattices and Gaussian probability distributions.
For any real r ≥ 0, [r] denotes the set {0, . . . , r } of all non-negative integers not greater than r. The uniform probability distribution over a set S is denoted U(S). We use the standard asymptotic notation
) if for every c there exists an n 0 such that |f (n)| < 1/n c for all n > n 0 .
Statistical distance.
The statistical distance is a measure of how two probability distributions are far apart from each other, and it is a convenient tool in the analysis of randomized algorithms and reductions. In this subsection we define the statistical distance and state some simple facts that will be used in the analysis of the reductions in this paper. All the properties of the statistical cc 16 (2007) distance stated in this subsection are easily verified. For more details the reader is referred to Micciancio & Goldwasser (2002, Chapter 8) .
Definition 2.1. Let X and Y be two discrete random variables over a (countable) set A. The statistical distance between X and Y is the quantity
In the case of continuous random variables, the statistical distance between
where δ X and δ Y are the probability density functions of X and Y respectively.
We say that two random variables X, Y are identically distributed (written X ≡ Y ) if and only if Pr {X ∈ S} = Pr {Y ∈ S} for every S ⊆ A. The reader can easily check that the statistical distance satisfies the usual properties of distance functions, i.e., Δ(X, Y ) ≥ 0 (with equality if and only if
The following proposition shows that applying a (possibly randomized) function to two distributions does not increase the statistical distance.
Proposition 2.2. Let X, Y be two random variables taking values in a common set A. For any (possibly randomized) function f with domain
As a corollary, we easily obtain the following.
Corollary 2.4. If X and Y are random variables over set A and p : A → {0, 1} is a predicate, then
Another useful property of the statistical distance is the following. 
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One-way hash function families.
A function family {f a : X → R} a∈A is a collection of functions (indexed by a set of keys A) with a common domain X and range R. A (polynomial) function ensemble is a sequence {f a : X n → R n } a∈An of function families (indexed by a security parameter n ∈ N) such that log |A n |, log |X n | and log |R n | are all polynomial in n. We assume that the elements of the sets A n , X n and R n can be efficiently represented with log 2 |A n |, log 2 |X n | and log 2 |R n | bits respectively, membership in the sets can be decided in polynomial time, and there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm to sample from those sets with (almost) uniform distribution. It is also common to assume that the functions f a are efficiently computable, in the sense that there is a polynomial time algorithm that on input n, a ∈ A n and x ∈ X n , outputs f a (x). All function ensembles considered in this paper have these properties, namely the sets A n , X n , R n have efficient representations and the functions f a are efficiently computable. A function (ensemble) is one-way if it is (easy to compute, but) computationally hard to invert, i.e., no algorithm can efficiently solve the following function inversion problem: given a pair (a, r) ∈ A n × R n , find an x ∈ X n such that f a (x) = r. One-wayness is an average-case complexity property, i.e., it requires that the function inversion problem is computationally hard when the input (a, r) ∈ A n × R n is selected at random. The exact definition, for the case of function ensembles, is given below. Definition 2.8. A function ensemble {f a : X n → R n } a∈An is one-way if for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the probability that
when a ∈ A n and x ∈ X n are selected uniformly at random, is negligible in n.
Notice that the input distribution underlying the definition of one-way function is not the uniform distribution over A n × R n , but rather it corresponds to choosing the target value r ∈ R n as the image of a uniformly random solution x ∈ X. For any function ensemble H = {f a : X → R} a∈A , we write owf(H) to denote the probability distribution {(a, f a (x)) : a ∈ A n , x ∈ X n } underlying the definition of one-way function, and U(A × R) to denote the uniform probability distribution over A × R. We remark that Definition 2.8 corresponds to the notion of strong one-way function, i.e., it is required that the success probability of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm in solving the function inversion problem (when the input is chosen according to distribution owf(H)) is negligible. The function families H = {f a : X → R} a∈A considered in this paper have the property that the input size log |X| is strictly bigger than the output size log |R|, i.e., the functions "compress" the size of the input by a factor log |X|/ log |R|. Such functions have many important applications in computer science and cryptography, and are generically called hash functions. In order to be useful, hash functions must satisfy some additional properties. A typical requirement is that if a ∈ A and x ∈ X are chosen uniformly at random, the distribution of f a (x) ∈ R is almost uniform and independent from a. In other words, owf(H) is statistically close to the uniform distribution U(A × R).
hash function family. We say that H is -regular if the statistical distance between owf(H) and the uniform distribution U(A × R) is at most . A hash function ensemble {H n } is called almost regular if there exists a negligible function
We remark that if a function is -regular for = 0, then the function maps the uniform input distribution to the uniform output distribution. So, Definition 2.9 is a generalization of the standard notion of regular function.
Lattices. Throughout the paper, we use column notation for all vectors, and use (·)
T to denote the matrix transposition operation. For example,
T is the n-dimensional column vector with entries x 1 , . . . , x n , and [x, . . . , x] is the n × n matrix with all columns equal to x.
An n-dimensional lattice 4 is the set of all integer combinations 
where Bx is the usual matrix-vector multiplication. For any basis B, we define the fundamental parallelepiped P(B) = {Bx : ∀i.0 ≤ x i < 1}. The following lemma shows how to sample lattice points uniformly at random from the fundamental parallelepiped associated to a given sublattice. 
The dual of a lattice L(B) (denoted L(B)
* ) is the lattice generated by the matrix (B −1 ) T , and consists of all vectors that have integer scalar product with all lattice vectors.
For any vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) T , define the cyclic rotation
and the corresponding circulant matrix
(Notice that x, and rot i (x) are all column vectors, and Rot(x) is the matrix whose columns are the cyclic rotations of x by construction. It is easy to see that also the rows of Rot(x) are all rotations of the same vector but with the entries in reverse order. For example, the last row of Rot (x) is (x n , . . . ,
x 1 ).) A lattice L(B) is cyclic if it is closed under the rotation operation, i.e., if x ∈ L(B) implies rot(x) ∈ L(B). It is easy to see that a lattice is cyclic if and only if L(B) = rot(L(B)).
The convolution product of two vectors x and y is the vector
with entries defined by the equation
It can be easily verified that the convolution product is associative and commutative, i.e., it satisfies the equational axioms x ⊗ (y ⊗ z) = (x ⊗ y) ⊗ z, and x ⊗ y = y ⊗ x. Moreover, it distributes over the vector addition operation: following inequalities, valid for any n-dimensional vectors x, y ∈ R n :
For any matrix or set of vectors S, we denote by S = max i s i the norm of the longest (column) vector in S.
The minimum distance of a lattice L(B), denoted λ 1 (L(B)), is the minimum distance between any two (distinct) lattice points and equals the length of the shortest nonzero lattice vector:
The notion of minimum distance can be generalized to define the ith successive minimum λ i as the smallest radius r such that the closed sphereB(r) = {x : x ≤ r} contains i linearly independent lattice points:
Another important constant associated to a lattice is the covering radius. The covering radius ρ(L(B)) of a lattice is the maximum distance dist(x, L(B)) when x ranges over the entire space R n :
A sublattice of L(B) is a (full rank) lattice L(S) such that L(S) ⊆ L(B).
In many algorithmic problems on point lattices the quality of a solution is measured with respect to some specific lattice parameter, e.g., the length λ 1 of the shortest nonzero vector, or the radius λ n of the smallest sphere containing n linearly independent lattice vectors. For example, the γ(n)-approximate shortest vector problem asks to find a nonzero vector in a lattice L(B) of length at most γ(n) · λ 1 (L(B)), where n is the rank of the lattice. For technical reasons, in this paper we consider generalized versions of various lattice problems where the quality of the solution is measured with respect to an arbitrary function of the lattice φ (L(B) ). The first of these problems is the following generalization of the shortest independent vector problem introduced by Micciancio (2004) . 
The shortest independent vectors problem SIVP γ (studied by Blömer & Seifert (1999) and used by Ajtai (2004); Cai & Nerurkar (1997) ; Micciancio (2004) ; Micciancio & Regev (2007) as a source of computational hardness) corresponds to SIVP φ γ with φ = λ n . Another problem that will play a fundamental role in this paper is the following. 
where n is the rank of the lattice.
This time it is natural to set φ = ρ to the covering radius of the lattice, because for any lattice basis B and target t ∈ R n , there is always a lattice point within distance ρ(L(B)) from t. When φ = ρ, we omit the superscript, and simply write GDD γ . GDD γ is an interesting variant of the closest vector problem (CVP), where the quality of the solution is measured with respect to the worst possible distance max t∈R n dist(
t, L(B)) rather then the distance of the given target dist(t, L(B)).
No polynomial time algorithm to solve SIVP γ or GDD γ within polynomial approximation factors γ(n) = n O(1) is known. A well known polynomial time algorithm for approximating SIVP is the basis reduction algorithm of Lenstra et al. (1982) , which on input a lattice B, computes a so-called LLL-reduced basis S for the same lattice. The exact definition of LLL-reduced basis is not important here. All we need in this paper is that the LLL-reduced basis satisfies S ≤ 2 n λ n (L(B)), i.e., it solves SIVP γ for approximation factors γ(n) = 2 n . A well known method to find lattice points close to a given target is Babai's nearest plane algorithm (Babai 1986 ). This is a polynomial time algorithm that on input a lattice S and a target point t, finds a lattice vector x ∈ L(S) within distance x − t ≤ ( √ n/2) S from the target. Notice that the quality of the solution depends on S . For example, when used in conjunction with the LLL basis reduction algorithm, the nearest plane algorithm returns a lattice point within distance
) from the target, i.e., it solves GDD γ for approximation factor γ(n) = √ n2 n . Slightly better approximations (namely, for slightly subexponential factors 2 O(n log log n/ log n) ) can be computed cc 16 (2007) in (probabilistic) polynomial time using more complex algorithms (Ajtai et al. 2001; Schnorr 1987 ), but they offer no advantages in the context of our paper.
Gaussian distributions.
We use the Gaussian distribution techniques recently introduced by Micciancio & Regev (2007) to simplify and improve the results described in a preliminary version of this paper (Micciancio 2002a) . In this subsection we recall all the required definitions and results from Micciancio & Regev (2007) . For any vectors c, x and any s > 0, let
be a Gaussian function centered in c scaled by a factor of s. The total measure associated to ρ s,c is x∈R
n is a probability density function. As noted in Micciancio & Regev (2007) , ρ s,c /s n can be expressed as the sum of n orthogonal 1-dimensional Gaussian distributions, and each of them can be efficiently approximated with arbitrary precision using standard techniques. So, the distribution ρ s,c /s n can be efficiently approximated. For simplicity, in this paper we work with real numbers and assume we can sample from ρ s,c /s n exactly. In practice, when only finite precision is available, ρ s,c /s n can be approximated by picking a fine grid, and selecting points from the grid with probability approximately proportional to ρ s,c /s n . All our arguments can be made rigorous by selecting a sufficiently fine grid.
Functions are extended to sets in the usual way; e.g., ρ s,c (A) = x∈A ρ s,c (x) for any countable set A. For any s, c and lattice Λ, define the discrete probability distribution (over the lattice Λ)
where x ∈ Λ. Intuitively, D Λ,s,c is the conditional probability 6 that a random variable with probability density function (ρ s,c /s n ) takes the value x given that the value of the random variable belongs to the lattice Λ. For brevity, we sometimes omit s or c from the notation ρ s,c and D Λ,s,c . When c or s are not specified, we assume that they are the origin and 1 respectively.
In Micciancio & Regev (2007) Gaussian distributions are used to define a new lattice invariant, called the smoothing parameter, defined as follows. In Micciancio & Regev (2007) many important properties of the smoothing parameter are established. Here we only need the following three bounds. The first one shows that the smoothing parameter is the amount of Gaussian noise that needs to be added to a lattice in order to get an almost uniform distribution. 
The second property shows that if s is sufficiently large, then the central second moment of the distribution D Λ,s,c is essentially the same as the one of the continuous Gaussian distribution ρ c,s /s n .
Lemma 2.19 (cf. Micciancio & Regev 2007, Lemma 4.2) . For any lattice Λ ⊂ R n , point c ∈ R n , unit vector u, and reals
The last property bounds the smoothing parameter in terms of λ n .
Lemma 2.20 (cf. Micciancio & Regev 2007, Lemma 3.3) . For any lattice Λ ⊂ R n and positive real > 0,
In particular, for any super-logarithmic function ω(log n) there is a negligible function (n) such that η (Λ) ≤ ω(log n) · λ n .
Two lemmas about cyclic lattices
In this section we prove two preliminary lemmas about cyclic lattices that will be used in the proof of our main results in the next section. The results 382 Micciancio cc 16 (2007) are presented here because their formulation is largely independent from the specific reduction in which they are used, and might be of independent interest. The first lemma gives an efficient algorithm to select a (full rank) cyclic lattice generated by a single short vector c from an arbitrary input lattice S. We remark that the lemma below will be used in settings where the vectors in S belong to a cyclic lattice L(B), so that the cyclic lattice L (Rot(c) ) generated by c ∈ L(S) is a sublattice of L(B). However, it is not generally the case that L (Rot(c) ) is a sublattice of L(S) because L(S) may not be cyclic.
Lemma 3.1. There exists a polynomial time algorithm that on input a full rank n-dimensional lattice S, computes a vector c ∈ L(S) such that c 1 ≤ 2n · S and Rot(c) has full rank.
Proof. Let S = S . We use Babai's nearest plane algorithm (Babai 1986) to find a vector c ∈ L(S) within Euclidean distance ( √ n/2) · S from nSe 1 . Notice that the 1 norm of c is at most
It remains to show that Rot(c) is a non-singular matrix, or equivalently, the n-dimensional volume of P(Rot(c)) is nonzero. Notice that P(Rot(c)) is an almost cubic parallelepiped obtained by perturbing the main vertexes of a hypercube of size l = nS by at most = ( √ n/2)S. In Micciancio (2002b) it is shown that, for all < 1 − 1/n · l/ √ n, the minimal volume of any such parallelepiped is (1 − ) n l n . In particular the volume is nonzero.
the volume of P(Rot(c)) is nonzero, and the matrix Rot(c) has full rank.
In Micciancio & Regev (2007) , Lemma 2.19 is used to prove that the expected squared norm d − c 2 (when d is chosen according to distribution D Λ,s,c ) is at most s 2 · n. In this paper we will need a bound on the expected value of the convolution product (d − c) ⊗ x 2 . It immediately follows from 7 The minimal volume (1 − ) n l n is achieved by the intuitive solution that shortens each edge by . Interestingly, when approaches l/ √ n, there are better ways to choose the perturbations that result in smaller volumes (Micciancio 2002b). cc 16 (2007) Generalized compact knapsacks 383 the result in Micciancio & Regev (2007) and inequality (2.13) that for any vector x, the expectation of (d − c) ⊗ x 2 is at most s 2 · n 2 · x 2 . Below, we use Lemma 2.19 to directly prove a stronger bound.
Lemma 3.2. For any n-dimensional lattice Λ, positive reals ≤ 1/3, s ≥ 2η (Λ) and vectors c, x ∈ R n ,
Proof. Let e 1 , . . . , e n be the standard basis of
T is the reverse of x. By linearity of expectation, we have
For every i = 1, . . . , n,
Using the assumption s ≥ 2η (Λ) and applying Lemma 2.19, we get that for all i = 1, . . . , n,
Adding up for all i and substituting in the previous equation we get 
Generalized compact knapsacks
The hash function families considered in this paper, as well as in previous works (Ajtai 2004; Cai & Nerurkar 1997; Micciancio 2004; Micciancio & Regev 2007) , are all special cases of the following general definition. 
for all a ∈ R m and x ∈ S m , where i x i · a i is computed using the ring addition and multiplication operations.
In this paper we consider the ring R = (F n p(n) , +, ⊗) of n-dimensional vectors over the finite field F p(n) with p(n) = n Θ(1) elements, with the usual vector addition operation and convolution product ⊗. For brevity, we will denote this ring simply as F n p(n) . We remark that for any prime p, the field F p is isomorphic to the ring Z p of integers modulo p. Here we use notation F n p instead of Z n p both because some of our results are valid even when p is not a prime, and also to emphasize that F n p is the ring of vectors with the convolution product operation, rather than the componentwise multiplication of the product ring Z n p . As for S, we consider the set S = D n ⊂ F n p of vectors with entries in an appropriately selected subset of F p . We want to study the hash function family H(F n p , D n , m), and prove that it is both almost regular and one-way. The rest of the section is organized as follows. In Section 4.1 we prove that H(F n p , D n , m) is almost regular. In Section 4.2 we introduce and start studying a new worst-case lattice problem that will be instrumental to prove our main result. In Section 4.3 we give a reduction from solving this problem in the worst case to the problem of inverting functions H(F 
In particular, for any p(n)
The proof of the theorem is based on the following lemma attributed to Rackoff by Impagliazzo and Zuckerman.
Lemma 4.3 (Impagliazzo & Zuckerman 1989, Claim 2). Let V, V be independent and identically distributed random variables taking values in a finite set S. If V, V have collision probability Pr {V = V } ≤ (1 + 4 2 )/|S|, then the statistical distance between V and the uniform distribution over S is at most .
Proof. For completeness, we give a sketch of the proof. Using the second inequality in (2.11), the statistical distance between V and U(S) can be bounded by 1 2
Expanding the square and adding up for all s ∈ S, the last expression can be rewritten as
which is at most under the assumption that Pr{V = V } ≤ (1 + 4 2 )/|S|.
We also need the following simple lemma. generated by z 1 , . . . , z m . In particular, for any z 1 , . . . , z m ∈ R and randomly chosen a 1 , . . . , a m ∈ R, the probability that
Proof . Let z 1 , . . . , z m ∈ R be arbitrary ring elements, and, for any b ∈ R, We are now ready to prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. We want to prove that owf(H(F n , D n , m)) is very close to the uniform distribution over (F
We first bound the collision probability of two independent copies of owf(
be two independent samples chosen according to the distribution
By definition, the elements a i , a i ∈ F n and x i , x i ∈ D n are all chosen independently and uniformly at random from their respective sets. Therefore, the collision probability is by x 1 − x 1 , . . . , x m − x m . Let I be the set of all ideals of (F n , +, ⊗). Conditioning on the ideal I, the collision probability can be expressed as
Pr (
In the rest of the proof, we regard F n as the ring of univariate polynomials
It follows that all ideals I ∈ I of the quotient ring F[α]/(α n − 1) are of the form Q(α) where Q(α) is a factor of α n − 1. (To see this, given an ideal I ∈ I, select a representative for each element of I, and let Q(α) be the greatest common divisor of all these representatives and the polynomial α n −1.)
be the factorization of (α n − 1) into irreducible polynomials over F, and for any subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , r}, let
wherex ranges over all polynomials of degree deg(x) < deg(Q S ), and the last inequality follows from the fact that, for any fixed value of the (n − deg(Q S )) higher order coefficients of x, the function x → x mod Q S is a bijection between sets of size |D| deg(Q S ) . Using the bound (4.5), we get
cc 16 (2007) and, adding up over all ideals,
This proves that the collision probability is at most n(m+1) . Therefore, by Lemma 4.3, the statistical distance between owf(H(F n , D n , m)) and the uniform distribution over
Now observe that random variable owf(H(F
n , D n , m)) takes values in the set (F n ) m × F n , which has size |F|(F n ) m × F n is at most = 1 2 1 + |F| |D| m n − 1 .
The worst case problems.
We want to show that inverting our generalized compact knapsack function H(F n , D n , m) (on the average and with non-negligible probability) is at least as hard as solving GDD γ (as well as various other related problems) over cyclic lattices in the worst case. Following Micciancio (2004) Generalized compact knapsacks 389 lattice vectors S, and a hyperplane H, the goal is to find a lattice vector not in H shorter than S by some constant factor.
Here we consider a different intermediate problem, which is an incremental version of GDD, where one is given a GDD instance (B, t) , a set of n linearly independent vectors S ⊂ L(B), and a sufficiently large real parameter r, and the goal is to find a lattice vector whose distance from the target is at most S /c + r for some constant c. 
and a real r > γ(n) · φ(L(B)), asks for a lattice vector s ∈ L(B) such that s − t ≤ ( S /c) + r.
In the rest of this subsection we show that many standard lattice problems reduce (via lattice-preserving reductions) to IncGDD. A reduction (say, from SIVP to IncGDD) is lattice-preserving if all calls to the IncGDD oracle are of the form (B, S, t, r) where B is the SIVP input lattice. Lattice-preserving reductions are particularly useful in the context of our paper because they allow to reduce a (worst-case) lattice problem over a given class of lattices (e.g., cyclic lattices) to another (worst-case) lattice problem over the same class of lattices. For example, the next lemma shows that SIVP on cyclic lattices can be solved in polynomial time given oracle access to a procedure that solves IncGDD on cyclic lattices. Proof. Given a basis B, our goal is to construct a set of n linearly independent vectors S of length S ≤ 4γ(n)φ(B). We do this by an iterative process. Initially, we set S to the result of applying the LLL basis reduction algorithm (Lenstra et al. 1982) to B, so that S is a basis for L(B) satisfying S ≤ 2 n λ n (L(B)). At each step, we identify the longest vector in S, say s i . We then take t to be a vector orthogonal to s 1 , . . . , s i−1 , s i+1 , . . . , s n of length S /2. We call the IncGDD oracle with the instance (B, S, t, S /4). If it fails, we terminate and output S. Otherwise, we obtain a lattice vector s within distance at most ( S /5) + S /4 = (9/20) S from t. Notice that s ≤ t + s − t ≤ (19/20) S . Moreover, s is linearly independent from {s 1 , . . . , s i−1 , s i+1 , . . . , s n } because it is at distance t − s − t ≥ S /20 > 0 from the hyperplane spanned by those vectors. So, we can replace s i with s and repeat the process. Notice that when the oracle call fails, it must be the case that S /4 ≤ γ(n)φ(B), and hence S ≤ 4γ(n)φ(B), as required. It remains to bound the running time of the reduction. Every iteration takes time polynomial in the size of B and S, which is polynomial in the size of the original input B because S is initially equal to a polynomial time computable function of B and S can only get smaller from one iteration to the next. Finally, consider the quantity log i s i . We know that initially s i ≤ 2 n λ n (L(B)) for all i. Moreover, log i s i decreases by a constant (namely, log 19/20) at each iteration, and it is always at least as large as log i min{ s i , (10/11)λ n (L(B))}. (To see this, observe that the vector selected for replacement at every iteration must satisfy (L(B) ).) Therefore, the procedure terminates after at most O(log i (11/10)2 n ) = O(n 2 ) iterations.
Next, we show how to use an IncGDD oracle to solve GDD. Proof. Given a basis B and a vector t, our goal is to find a lattice vector within distance 2γ(n)φ(B) of t. First, we apply the reduction in Lemma 4.7 to obtain a set S ⊂ L(B) of n linearly independent vectors of length at most S ≤ 4γ(n)φ(B). Then, we apply the LLL basis reduction algorithm (Lenstra et al. 1982) to B to obtain a basis for the same lattice such that B ≤ 2 n λ n (B). Define r = ( √ n/4) B and call the IncGDD oracle on input (B, S, t, r). If the oracle returns an invalid answer, 9 it must be that r ≤ γ(n)φ(B), and we can efficiently find a lattice vector s within distance ( √ n/2) B = 2r ≤ 2γ(n)φ(B) from the target t using Babai's nearest plane algorithm (Babai 1986) . So, assume the oracle call IncGDD(B, S, t, r) succeeds. We keep calling the IncGDD oracle with smaller and smaller values of r, until either a call returns an invalid answer or r gets too small. Specifically, at each iteration we decrease r by a factor 10/11, as long as r > S /4. Notice that if r ≤ S /4 and the oracle IncGDD(B, S, t, r) returns a valid answer s, then we can terminate with output s because
Finally, assume that the oracle succeeds for some value of r, but fails in the next iteration. Since the oracle fails on input (10/11)r, it must be that (10/11)r ≤ cc 16 (2007) Generalized compact knapsacks 391 (L(B) ). Therefore, the vector s returned by the oracle on input r satisfies dist(s, t) ≤ r + S 5
as required. This concludes the description of the reduction. The reduction is correct because in every case, it terminates with a lattice vector within distance 2γ(n)φ (L(B) ) from the target. Moreover, it is clear that each iteration can be implemented in time polynomial in the size of the original B. In order to complete the proof we only need to make sure that the number of iterations is also polynomial. Notice that since S ≥ λ n (B) (by definition of λ n ) and B ≤ 2 n λ n (B) (by the properties of LLL reduced basis), the number of iterations is at most log 11/10 ( Micciancio & Regev (2007) is that of finding a small integer linear dependency among randomly chosen elements of the additive group Z n p . This problem is shown to be at least as hard as finding short vectors in an arbitrary lattice B roughly 10 as follows:
1. First, the group Z n p is embedded into the space spanned by the lattice B by dividing each side of the fundamental parallelepiped P(B) into p equal parts, yielding p n subregions naturally corresponding to the group elements.
2. Next, samples from the group Z n p are chosen by selecting (almost) uniformly distributed vectors y i ∈ P(B), and rounding them to the corners a i of the corresponding subregions of P(B). The fundamental idea cc 16 (2007) of Micciancio & Regev (2007) (also used in this paper) is that random points y i ∈ P(B) can be efficiently generated together with nearby lattice vectors by choosing a relatively short random vector y i (with Gaussian distribution), and reducing it modulo the lattice. This yields a point y i = y i mod B distributed almost uniformly at random within P(B), together with a nearby lattice point (y i − y i ) ∈ L(B).
3. Since the vectors y i are (almost) uniformly distributed over P(B), the associated rounded vectors a i correspond to (almost) uniformly chosen group elements in Z n p . So, one can use the average-case oracle to find a small integer linear dependency relation (x 1 , . . . , x m ) modulo p among the group elements. It is easy to see that (x 1 , . . . , x m ) . Moreover, approximating each rounded vector a i with nearby lattice point (y i − y i ), yields another lattice
can compute a short vector in the original lattice L(B) by taking the difference i (a i − y i + y i ) · x i between these two lattice points.
The main novelty in our reduction is that we need to embed (into the space spanned by the lattice), not just the additive group Z n p , but rather the more sophisticated ring structure (Z n p , +, ⊗) of n-dimensional vectors with the usual modular addition and new convolution product operation. Remarkably, our reduction achieves this by exploiting the rotational symmetry of cyclic lattices. Technically, the above reduction is modified by replacing the parallelepiped P(B) (used to embed Z n p ) with the region P(C) associated to an appropriately chosen sublattice. Namely, C = Rot(c) is a matrix obtained by taking the cyclic rotations of a single vector c. The reason why this small modification makes the reduction work is mostly algebraic, rather than purely geometric as in Ajtai (2004) ; Micciancio & Regev (2007) . Still, our embedding inherits some of the geometric intuition of Ajtai's proof (Ajtai 2004) , making the Gaussian techniques of Micciancio & Regev (2007) 
Another difference between the reductions of Ajtai (2004); Micciancio & Regev (2007) and ours, is that (for technical reasons) here we need to work with inhomogeneous variants of both the average-case and worst-case problems. For example, instead of considering the problem of finding a linear dependency among ring elements (i.e., a linear combination that adds up to zero), we consider the problem of inverting the generalized knapsack function (i.e., finding a linear combination of the knapsack weights that adds up to a given random target value). Again, the reason why this change is necessary to make our cc 16 (2007) Generalized compact knapsacks 393 reduction work is mostly algebraic, not geometric.
11 So, while the geometric intuition behind Ajtai's proof (as described above) can be useful to achieve a superficial understanding of our proof as well, we warn the reader that part of the proof is algebraic in nature and it is best understood by putting the geometric interpretation aside. 
then there is a probabilistic polynomial time reduction from solving IncGDD
δ in the worst case over cyclic lattices (with high probability), to inverting the generalized compact knapsack function
on the average (with non-negligible probability).
Proof. For any instance
be the corresponding set of solutions. Let F be an oracle that on input an instance Q selected at random according to distribution
outputs a solution F (Q) ∈ Γ(Q) with non-negligible probability. Let β(n) be the probability that F (Q) ∈ Γ(Q) whenQ is selected uniformly at random from
by Theorem 4.2 the probability distribution
. Therefore, β(n) is non-negligible too. We use F to solve problem IncGDD η γ,c over cyclic lattices in the worst case, with non-negligible probability Ω(β(n)). Since we are solving IncGDD η γ,c in the worst case, the success probability of the reduction can be made exponentially close to 1 using standard repetition techniques. (b) Generate a random noise vector y i with probability density y i ∼ ρ s /s n for s = 2r/γ(n), and let y i = y i mod B.
4. Define the generalized compact knapsack problem instance (4.10)
and invoke F (Q) to find a potential solution
5. Let x 0 = −e 1 , and return the vector
The correctness of the reduction is based on the following two lemmas. The first lemma shows that if the oracle F successfully outputs a solution X ∈ Γ(Q), then the reduction outputs a lattice vector s ∈ L(B).
Proof. Let X ∈ Γ(Q) be a valid solution to knapsack instance (4.10). In particular, assume 12 X = (x 1 , . . . , x m(n) ) satisfies (4.12)
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Using the distributive and associative properties of ⊗, vector s can be rewritten as the sum
We claim that all terms in the summation belong to the lattice L(B). First of all notice that for any i ≥ 0, the vector
Using the cyclicity of L(B), we get that all columns of Rot(v i + y i − y i ) belong to the lattice, and
because x i has integer entries. For the last term, we use equalities (4.12) and
is an integer vector, and
belongs to the lattice.
The second lemma shows that the input Q to the oracle F is almost uniformly distributed, and therefore F (Q) is successful with probability very close to β(n).
Lemma 4.13. For any s ≥ η (n) (L(B)), the statistical distance of Q (as defined in (4.10) ) from the uniform distribution is at most
In particular, for any polynomially bounded m(n) = n O(1) , and negligible function (n) = n −ω(1) , the distribution of Q is within negligible distance from the Proof. We first bound the distance of each a i mod p(n) from the uniform distribution over F n p(n) . Notice that
So, if y i were distributed uniformly at random over P(B), then (v i + y i ) mod Rot(c) would be uniform over P (Rot(c)) , and a i mod p(n) would also have perfectly uniform distribution over F n p(n) . Consider a i mod p(n) as a randomized function of y i , i.e., define the randomized function Rot(c) ) is chosen uniformly at random. Notice that g(y i ) = a i mod p(n). We observed that g maps the uniform distribution over P(B) to the uniform distribution over F n p(n) , i.e., g(U(P(B))) = U(F n p(n) ). Therefore, by Proposition 2.2 the statistical distance between a i mod p(n) and the uniform distribution over
Notice that y i has distribution ρ s /s n mod P(B). Using the assumption s ≥ η (L(B)) and Lemma 2.18, we get that
Now consider the knapsack instance Q defined in (4.10). Since the elements of Q are independently distributed, by Proposition 2.6 we have
The last term satisfies
Generalized compact knapsacks 397 Therefore,
We are now ready to prove the correctness of the reduction. Namely, we want to prove that for any n-dimensional cyclic lattice basis B, full rank subset S ⊂ L(B), target t, and r > γ(n) · η (L(B)), the reduction outputs a lattice vector s ∈ L(B) such that s − t ≤ r + S /c with non-negligible probability Ω(β(n)). By Lemma 4.11, s ∈ L(B) is satisfied whenever oracle F returns a valid solution X = F (Q) ∈ Γ(Q). Therefore, the success probability of the reduction is at least (L(B) ). So, by Lemma 4.13, Δ(Q,Q) is negligible. Therefore, the first probability in (4.14) satisfies
We bound the second probability in (4.14) using Markov's inequality: We will prove that the conditional expectation E s − t X ∈ Γ(Q) is at most (2/3)(1 + 2/m(n)) · (r + S /c), so that (4.15) is at least
This proves that (4.14) (and therefore also the success probability of the reduction) is at least Ω(β(n)) · Ω(1) = Ω(β(n)). It remains to bound the expected length of s − t. By the triangle inequality,
We will show that the first and third term can be made arbitrarily small by using a sufficiently large value for p(n).
(Here is where we use the assumption
.) The second term requires the most effort and it is bounded using the properties of Gaussian distributions. Notice that
Since c 1 ≤ 2n S by construction and w − w ∞ ≤ 1 for any vector w, we have (4.17)
Similarly, we have
Multiplying (4.17) by x i and using
Generalized compact knapsacks 399 Substituting (4.18) and (4.19) in (4.16), and using the second inequality in (2.12)
, the first term in the last expression is at most
We want to prove that the conditional expectation of the second term satisfies
so that the expectation of s − t is at most (2/3)(1 + 2/m(n))(r + S /c) as claimed. In order to prove (4.21) we fix the value of X, Q and Y = [y 0 , . . . , y m(n) ], and consider the conditional expectation of s − t given all these values. We will show that for any fixed Q, X and Y (satisfying X ∈ Γ(Q)), the conditional expectation of s−t satisfies the bound in (4.21). Equation (4.21) immediately follows by averaging over all possible values of Q, X and Y such that X ∈ Γ(Q). So, in the rest of the proof, we fix the value of Q, X and Y , and consider the conditional distribution of the vectors y i . Notice that, given y i , vector y i must necessarily belong to the set y i + L(B), but it is otherwise random and independent from Q, X, Y and all other y j 's. So, the conditional distribution of
In other words, the conditional distribution of (
By convexity, we get
Finally, adding up for all values of i and using the definition of s = 2r/γ(n) and
This concludes the proof that the conditional expectation of s − t given X ∈ Γ(Q) is at most (2/3)(1 + 2/m(n))(r + S /c), and the reduction succeeds with non-negligible probability Ω(β(n)).
By choosing a small enough δ > 0 in the previous theorem, we obtain the following corollary. Micciancio (2004) ; Micciancio & Regev (2007) can be formulated as a reduction from solving SIVP in the worst case to solving SVP on the average. In this paper we have shown that inverting our generalized compact knapsack functions on the average is at least as hard as the worst case instance of GDD, as well as other lattice problems, over cyclic lattices. We now show how inverting the compact knapsack function can also be formulated as a lattice problem. A compact knapsack function a 1 , . . . , a m implicitly defines a lattice in dimension O(m · n) given by the set of all (y
T such that a i ⊗ y i = 0. In fact, using matrix notation, one can consider the weights a 1 , . . . , a m as a compact representation of an n × m · n matrix
which defines a lattice Λ(A) = {x : Ax = 0 mod p} in the usual way. Up to a permutation of the coordinates, it is immediate to see that the lattice associated to matrix A above is quasi-cyclic of order m, i. So, our result can be interpreted as follows: if GDD on n-dimensional cyclic lattices is hard to approximate within n 1+ factors in the worst case, then CVP on ω(n) dimensional ω(1)-cyclic lattices is hard to solve on the average.
Many open problems remain. First and foremost, since the security of the cryptographic function proposed in this paper relies on the hardness of lattice problems on cyclic lattices, it would be very interesting to investigate the worst case complexity of computational problems on cyclic lattices, as discussed in the introduction. In the rest of this section we describe other open problems (and recent results) concerning the construction of various cryptographic primitives and improvement of the worst-case inapproximability factor required by the proof of security. Cryptographic applications. From a practical point of view, it would be nice to prove that our function satisfies stronger security guarantees than onewayness. For the case of general lattices, it is known (Goldreich et al. 1996; Micciancio & Regev 2007 ) that under the assumption that SIVP is hard to approximate in the worst case within almost linear factors ω(n log n), the generalized subset-sum function over Z n p is not only one-way, but also collision resistant. Unfortunately, technical differences between our proof and the one in Micciancio & Regev (2007) make it hard to establish the same result for the compact knapsack function. At the time this paper was written, we left as an open problem to prove or disprove that our generalized compact knapsack function is collision resistant. This problem has been independently settled in Lyubashevsky & Micciancio (2006) and Peikert & Rosen (2006) , where it is shown that the generalized compact knapsack function proposed in this paper is not collision resistant (in fact, it is not even a universal one-way hash function), but it can be turned into a collision resistant hash function (under essentially the same worst-case complexity assumption) by suitably restricting its domain or modifying the underlying ring. In Lyubashevsky & Micciancio (2006) ; Peikert & Rosen (2006) it is also shown that the function is secure even when the number of weights m(n) = O(1) is constant, improving over the almost constant bound m(n) = ω(1) used in this paper.
It would be interesting to use the techniques developed in this paper to build (very efficient) cryptographic primitives other than one-way functions and collision resistant hash functions. One-way functions are known to be sufficient to build many other useful cryptographic primitives, like pseudo-random generators (Goldreich & Levin 1989; Håstad et al. 1999) , one-way hash functions (Naor & Yung 1989) , commitment schemes (Naor 1991) , digital signatures schemes (Rompel 1990 ), or private key encryption schemes (Goldreich et al. 1986 ). However, these generic constructions are rather inefficient, so with their use most of the efficiency benefits of our compact knapsack function would be lost. We leave as an open problem the construction of any such provably secure cryptographic primitive with efficiency comparable to our one-way function, and based on similar worst-case intractability assumptions. As already mentioned above, for the case of hash functions, this problem has been recently solved in Lyubashevsky & Micciancio (2006) ; Peikert & Rosen (2006) , where it is shown that a simple variant of the function proposed in this paper is collision resistant, and therefore also a one-way hash function. We also observe that by standard reductions (Damgård et al. 1997; Naor & Yung 1989) , the collision resistant hash functions of Lyubashevsky & Micciancio (2006) ; Peikert & Rosen (2006) also yield efficient constructions of (statistically hiding) commitment schemes based on the worst-case hardness of cyclic lattices.
cc 16 (2007) Finally, and probably the hardest of the open problems concerning the cryptographic applicability of our techniques, is to build a public-key encryption scheme (or a trapdoor function) with efficiency and security guarantees similar to our compact knapsack function. Building public-key encryption schemes seems a much harder problem than building one-way functions or private key encryptions. Still, we believe that designing public-key encryption schemes with efficiency and security properties similar to our one-way function may not be so out of reach. We remark that the class of cyclic lattices used in this paper is related to (although different from) the class of "convolutional modular lattices" used by NTRU (Hoffstein et al. 1998 ), a commercial public-key cryptosystem based on lattices. Specifically, the lattices used by NTRU can be described as quasi-cyclic lattices of order 2, i.e., lattices that are invariant under cyclic shifts by 2 positions. Unfortunately, no proof of security is known for NTRU (even based on nontrivial average-case complexity assumptions). Still, based on the similarities between NTRU and other lattice-based cryptosystems (Micciancio 2001b) , we hope that, as Ajtai's one-way function (Ajtai 2004 ) inspired the design of public-key cryptosystems (Ajtai & Dwork 1997; Regev 2004b) , our work will provide a starting point for the design of efficient and provably secure public-key cryptosystems based on cyclic lattices. Proving the security of NTRU, or finding alternative ways to build public-key cryptosystems with efficiency and security properties similar to our one-way function is left as an open problem.
Improving the connection factor. The worst-case inapproximability factor for SIVP and GDD required by our one-way function is n 1+ , for arbitrarily small > 0. A modest improvement has been recently achieved in Lyubashevsky & Micciancio (2006) ; Peikert & Rosen (2006) , who proved that (a variant of) the generalized compact knapsack proposed in this paper is as hard to invert on the average (in fact, even collision resistant) as approximating SIVP (on cyclic lattices) within a factor n log O(1) n, essentially matching similar results for general lattices (Micciancio & Regev 2007) . An interesting open question is whether it is possible to do even better than that. We remark that the worst-case problems solved by our reduction are somehow harder than SIVP and GDD. Our reduction allows to solve SIVP η and GDD η within almost linear factors, and then uses known relations between the smoothing parameter η and standard lattice parameters like λ n and ρ. An interesting question is whether better relations between η, λ n and ρ can be proved in the case of cyclic lattices. For the case of GDD, we showed how to solve GDD λn within almost linear factors n 1+ , and then used the inequality ρ ≥ λ n /2 to express our result in terms of GDD = GDD ρ . Since ρ can be larger than λ n by √ n/2 (even for the case of cyclic lattices), our reduction may approximate GDD within factors much smaller than n 1+ , potentially as low as n 0.5+ , depending on the input lattice. We leave as an open problem to prove that the generalized compact knapsack function is as hard to invert as approximating GDD over cyclic lattices in the worst case within factors γ(n) = n 0.5+ .
